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Abstract
We study incumbency advantage in markets with positive consumption ex-
ternalities. Users of an incumbent platform receive stochastic opportunities
to migrate to an entrant. They can accept a migration opportunity or wait
for a future opportunity. In some circumstances, users have incentives to
delay migration until others have migrated. If they all do so, no migration
takes place, even when migration would have been Pareto-superior. This
provides an endogenous micro-foundation for incumbency advantage. We
use our framework to identify environments where incumbency advantage is
larger.
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JEL Classication Codes: D85, L14, R23, L15, L16
1 Introduction
The utility of joining a telecommunications or a social media platform, buying
a game console, or adopting an industry standard depends on who else has
joined the platform, plays the same game, or uses the same standard. Users
choose which platform to use, game to purchase, or standards to adopt based
on their predictions of the number of users who will make the same choice.
Economists and practitioners often believe that this makes entry difficult as
users worry that others will not migrate from an incumbent to an entrant
platform, even when the latter offers a superior product. This is easy to
understand when there are important switching costs; it is more difficult to
explain when incumbency advantage stems from network externalities, the
issue we tackle in this paper.1
The topic has policy relevance as incumbency advantage forms the basis
of many recent analyses and policy recommendations. For an example, con-
sider the 2018 $7.5 billion acquisition by Microsoft of GitHub, a collaborative
coding platform which, at the time of the acquisition, was used by 28 million
developers working on 85 million projects.2,3 GitHub is used by closed teams,
but it is especially popular in the Open Source community which can use it
at zero cost. The European Commission was concerned that incumbency
advantage would impair the migration of users from GitHub to competing
platforms, and that this would allow Microsoft to degrade its quality, per-
haps by favouring Microsoft's own technologies. One can imagine that the
Microsoft legal team acknowledged that the Commission's concerns would be
valid if GitHub were a social network, but argued that its users are actually
very sophisticated, well aware of the alternatives, and would surely migrate
if the platform were degraded. Ultimately, the Commission approved the
1In most real world cases, there would be both switching costs and network externalities.
As Crémer and Biglaiser (2012) argue, the interaction between the two phenomena is
understudied.
2Our sources about this acquisition include the following pages, accessed on 9 July
2019:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6155_en.htm, https://usef
yi.com/github-history/, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019
-06-03/open-source-great-satan-no-more-microsoft-wins-over-skeptics,
https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/18/17474284/microsoft-github-acquisition-d
eveloper-reaction.
3Actually, repositories. For discussion, see https://help.github.com/en/articles/
about-repositories.
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acquisition (see European Commission (2018),  98-102).
We draw two lessons from this story. First, the Commission's decision
seems reasonable and has been the object of little public criticism, but this
seems to contradict the widespread belief that incumbency advantage is per-
vasive and important  that is something which needs explaining. Second,
we know of no article in the economic literature that would have helped the
Commission evaluate the claims made by Microsoft's legal team. There have
been debates around the pervasiveness and size of incumbency advantage
in the economy as a whole but, as we will discuss in section 2, very little
theoretical work on the sources of incumbency advantage.
Explaining the relationship between network externalities and incum-
bency advantage is also an interesting analytical challenge. Consider, as
we will, a situation in which all the users are initially on an incumbent plat-
form and where they would all prefer to the status quo a collective migration
to a new entrant platform. In the game in which each of the users chooses a
platform, no-migration is a Pareto inferior equilibrium, but the one which the
literature typically focuses on. This contradicts the assumption commonly
made in other branches of economic theory where the Pareto superior equi-
librium is often selected, without further discussion. To solve this quandary,
we propose a new model of the migration process.
We make two main contributions. First, we develop a micro-founded
model in which incumbency advantage emerges endogenously. Second, we
study how incumbency advantage is determined by the migration process
available to individuals. In our model, even if every consumer prefers a col-
lective migration to the entrant platform, each consumer prefers that others
migrate first to avoid spending time alone on the new platform. They are
somewhat like pedestrians on the sidewalk of a street with slow traffic. They
know that they can safely cross en masse, but each of them would prefer
others to step on the road first.
To be more precise, we identify the circumstances under which no user
initiates the migration process because, even if they believed that the others
will migrate, accepting early migration opportunities implies giving up too
much of the network value of the incumbent platform. In order to do this,
we depart from Farrell and Saloner (1985), who assume that each user of
the incumbent has a single opportunity to migrate. Instead, we assume that
other opportunities will arise in the future. This yields very different dy-
namics and generates incumbency advantage even when Farrell and Saloner
predict it would be absent. One of the main results of our paper is that,
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perhaps surprisingly, incumbency advantage is greater when users have mul-
tiple migration opportunities than only one (Proposition 4). Building on this
foundation, we discuss how the stochastic process that generates migration
opportunities, what we call the migration process, influences the existence of
a migration equilibrium.
After a discussion of the literature in section 2, in section 3.1 we study
the strategy of a single individual who receives opportunities to migrate from
an incumbent platform (whose value is decreasing over time) to an entrant
platform (whose value is increasing) and must decide which ones to accept.
Under mild assumptions, she uses a threshold strategy, accepting all op-
portunities to migrate after a cutoff time. In section 3.2, we embed the
individual's problem in an equilibrium model and study the existence of a
migration equilibrium, whose properties we explore in the remainder of Sec-
tion 3. Our focus is on describing how the migration process itself, rather
than the beliefs of the agents, can impede migration to a superior platform:
when there are several equilibria, we select the one with migration. We show
that incumbency advantage is larger when users have multiple rather than
a single opportunity to migrate. We also show that, for low discount rates,
incumbency advantage is invariant to the speed of the migration process and
only depends on its shape.
In section 4, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on the fundamentals on our
model and explore the characteristics of migration processes that affect the
size of the incumbency advantage. For instance, we show that incumbency
advantage increases when migration is more coordinated and is invariant to
the speed of the migration process.
In section 5, we examine a parameterized setting where opportunities
to migrate arise according to a combination of two natural and easily in-
terpretable processes: a word of mouth process, where opportunities arise
when a user of the incumbent platform randomly meets a user who has
already migrated; and an autonomous process, where opportunities to mi-
grate arise at a constant rate, for instance due to a constant flow of ad-
vertisements. This formulation provides a novel micro foundation for the
Bass diffusion model, one of the workhorses of the marketing literature (see
Bass, 1969, 2004, among many others). We study how incumbency advantage
varies with the weight of the two component processes. When word of mouth
is the dominant of the two processes, migration only occurs when users prefer
being alone on the entrant platform to sharing the incumbent platform with
all the other users (i.e., when it is a dominant strategy to migrate). When
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the autonomous component dominates, we show that there can be excessive
or insufficient migration.
We then extend our model to explore other institutional features that
can affect incumbency advantage. In Section 6.1, we show that incumbency
advantage increases when users receive subsequent migration opportunities
faster than the first one (for instance because users become more aware of
the existence of the entrant platform). We demonstrate in Section 6.2 that
the entrant can decrease incumbency advantage by committing to a capacity
constraint, so that not all users can join it. Finally, we find that the possibility
of multi-homing decreases, but does not eliminate, incumbency advantage.
This provides some support to the policy recommendations that competition
authorities should pay special attention to practices that hinder multi-homing
(see, for instance, Crémer, de Montjoye and Schweitzer, 2019).
In Section 7, we examine the consequences of heterogeneity of users. We
allow some users to prefer the entrant platform, while others actively dislike
it. There can exist a staggered migration equilibrium where, initially, only
those users who find the entrant platform most attractive migrate, while oth-
ers wait until enough users have joined the entrant. If user preferences are
sufficiently polarised, there exists an equilibrium where the different types of
users settle on different platforms. In this case, the equilibrium can be inef-
ficient since users do not internalize the network externalities they generate.
Conclusions and paths for future research are presented in section 8.
2 Literature Review
We know of no econometric evidence of the size of incumbency advantage
or of its determinant. On the other hand, there has been a vigorous dis-
cussion, often based on case studies, on the importance of lock-in. Arthur
(1989) presents an early analysis of lock-in due to network effects while Levin
(2013), among others, argue that it is unlikely. This article contributes to
this debate by formalising an endogenous micro-foundation for incumbency
advantage and studying how migration processes influence the level of in-
cumbency advantage.
The article the most closely related to our work is Farrell and Saloner
(1985). They consider a finite number of users who choose sequentially be-
tween two platforms, and show that users always coordinate on the superior
platform. The last consumer who is given the choice to join the (Pareto)
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superior platform does so if the others have joined. The penultimate con-
sumer, predicting that the last one will join, will herself join, and so forth.
In contrast, our model allows for multiple opportunities to migrate, which
significantly changes the model's predictions.
Farrell and Saloner also analyze a two-player model of incomplete in-
formation and show there can be excessive momentum or excessive inertia.
Other authors also use imperfect information to explain incumbency advan-
tage, in models where users sequentially must make a once and for all decision
of which technology to use. Choi (1997) assumes that the quality of a tech-
nology becomes known to all users as soon as a single user adopts it. There
will be less experimentation with new technologies than is optimal, because
users fear being stranded by themselves once they adopt. Ochs and Park
(2010) analyze an environment where a finite number of players differ in
their how large a platform must be before they find it worthwhile to join.
Each agent knows his own type, but there is aggregate uncertainty about the
composition of the pool of players. They show that this uncertainty leads to
inefficient adoption decisions.
Unlike the above papers, we assume a continuum of users and measurable
strategies so that no single user can affect the decisions of the others. As in
Farrell and Saloner (1985), adoption can also be inefficient in our setting, but
the source of this inefficiency is not the bandwagon effect of early movers
on later ones.
In the second part4 of a follow-up paper, Farrell and Saloner (1986) an-
alyze a model with network effects and two consumers who receive oppor-
tunities to switch according to a Poisson process. As in our model, users
have multiple opportunities to switch. They find that there can be excessive
inertia or excessive momentum relative to the efficient allocation. We allow
for much more general migration processes and are able to characterize how
the migration process affects the possibility of migration.
Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2005) analyze a model where there is uncertainty
regarding the time at which a firm can adopt a new standard, and a free
riding effect can induce the non-adoption of a Pareto dominant standard.
By contrast, in our paper, there is uncertainty regarding when each agent
will receive her next opportunity to migrate but the adoption decision of an
individual agent does not affect other agent's decisions.
4In the first part, Farrell and Saloner use a model of successive choice by users to study
what inefficiencies can stem from the presence of early adopters of an inferior technology.
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Some papers explicitly examine the role of platform behavior in consumer
adoption dynamics. Early papers include Katz and Shapiro (1992), where
firms compete in price with entry of new consumers over time. Sakovics and
Steiner (2012) study a model where a monopoly platform chooses the order
in which to attract users and how much to subsidize each of them. Cabral
(2019) studies a model of competition between platforms that adjust their
prices dynamically. We abstract from strategic considerations by firms and
focus on user decisions. Moreover, we also study circumstances where the
order in which users join the platform is potentially based on the distribution
of user heterogeneity, rather than chosen directly by a profit maximizing
platform.
Haªaburda, Jullien and Yehezkel (forthcoming) and Biglaiser and Crémer
(forthcoming) allow firms to choose prices to attract consumers, but assume
that all consumers make migration decisions after each round of price setting
by firms, as do Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). These papers analyze the way
in which dynamic competition between firms affects incumbency advantage,
whereas we focus on the role of the behavior of consumers.
Finally, in a different line of inquiry Gordon, Henry and Murtoz (2018)
study the way in which the graph theoretical shape of networks influence the
spread of an innovation in a model with local externalities.
3 Model and equilibrium
3.1 One user choosing when to migrate
We will provide a micro-foundation in 3.2, but for now consider the problem
of a single user of an incumbent platform I who must decide if and when to
migrate to an entrant platform E  for simplicity we assume that migration
is irreversible.5
At time t ≥ 0 the utility of the user is u˜I(t) on the incumbent platform
and u˜E(t) on the entrant platform. Because other users are migrating or
due to other factors such as changes in the design of the platforms or in
prices, we assume that the difference of utility u˜E(t) − u˜I(t), is increasing
5The migration equilibrium we focus on below still exists if migration is reversible, but
reversibility would introduce significant complexity and, we believe, a number of additional
equilibria (where, for instance, individuals might follow each other back and forth across
the platforms).
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in t. From the perspective of the individual, the evolution of utilities over
time is exogenous and unaffected by her actions. If there is migration, one
would expect u˜E(0) − u˜I(0) < 0 and limt→+∞ u˜E(t) − u˜I(t) > 0, but these
conditions are not necessary for the results of this section.
In any interval of time [t, t + dt], a consumer in the incumbent platform
receives an opportunity to migrate with probability µ˜(t)×dt. The function µ˜
is called the migration process and plays a crucial role in the sequel. A key
innovation of this article is to describe the effects of changes in µ˜. We assume
that µ˜(t) > 0 for all t.
Our preferred interpretation is that the migration process µ˜ stems from a
psychological (rather than a physical) process where, for instance, consumers
think about or are reminded of the existence of the entrant platform at
random times. This could be due, for example, to advertising by the entrant
platform, word of mouth from other users who have already migrated, or
simply because users remember at random times to re-optimize their choice
of platform. One could think of consumers as being myopic in the sense of
only thinking about migrating when they are given an opportunity (in all
other dimensions, individuals are fully rational).
A strategy for the consumer is a measurable function φ(t) : <+ → [0, 1]
which is interpreted as the probability that the agent accepts a migration
opportunity that arises at time t. The consumer migrates during a small
interval [t, t+dt] if and only if she has the opportunity to do so, which happens
with probability µ˜(t)×dt, and if she accepts this opportunity, which she does
with probability φ(t). Therefore, the probability of migration during [t, t+dt]
is φ(t)× µ˜(t)× dt. If the agent is on the incumbent at time t, she still is on
the incumbent at time t+ dt with probability 1− φ(t)µ˜(t)dt. Therefore, the
probability pi(t) that the consumer is on the incumbent at time t satisfies
pi(t+ dt) = pi(t)× [1− µ˜(t)φ(t)dt] (1)
which implies6
pi(t) = exp
[
−
∫ t
0
µ˜(τ)φ(τ)dτ
]
. (2)
6From (1) and using pi(0) = 1:
pi(t+ dt)− pi(t)
dt
= −pi(t)µ˜(t)φ(t)⇒ pi′(t) = −pi(t)µ(t)φ(t)⇒ ln(pi(t)) = −
∫ t
0
µ˜(τ)φ(τ)dτ.
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Letting r be the discount rate, the discounted utility of the user is∫ ∞
0
[
u˜I(t)pi(t) + u˜E(t)(1− pi(t)
]
e−rtdt
=
∫ ∞
0
[
u˜I(t)− u˜E(t)
]
pi(t)e−rtdt+
∫ ∞
0
u˜E(t)e
−rtdt.
Since the second term does not depend on φ, the user's problem is to choose
a strategy φ which maximizes∫ ∞
0
[u˜I(t)− u˜E(t)]pi(t)e−rtdt
subject to (2).
The following proposition is a direct consequence of Proposition A.1 which
can be found, along with its proof, in appendix A. It states that, once a user
has started to accept migration opportunities with positive probability, then
she will accept all future opportunities with probability one. We will call
these strategies threshold strategies.
Proposition 1. If u˜E(0)− u˜I(0) ≥ 0, the user accepts all migration oppor-
tunities: φ∗(t) = 1 for nearly all t. If limt→+∞ u˜E(∞)− u˜I(∞) ≤ 0, the user
accepts no migration opportunities: φ∗(t) = 0 for nearly all t.
If u˜E(0)− u˜I(0) < 0 and limt→+∞ u˜E(t)− u˜I(t) > 0, there exists a unique
T < inf{t : u˜E(t) − u˜I(t) ≥ 0} such that the user does not migrate before T
and accepts all migration opportunities afterwards:
φ∗(t) =
{
0 for nearly all t < T ,
1 for nearly all t > T .
Moreover, T satisfies7
T = 0 and
∫ +∞
T
[u˜E(t)− u˜I(t)] pi(t) e−rtdt ≥ 0, (3a)
or T > 0 and
∫ +∞
T
[u˜E(t)− u˜I(t)] pi(t) e−rtdt = 0, (3b)
where pi(t) is defined by (2).
7It is tempting to interpret the integrals in (3a) and (3b) as the future discounted utility
of the user. For instance, (3b) would state that if T > 0, then the discounted utility of
the user from T on is equal to 0. However, this is an artefact of the exponential function.
As the proof in Appendix A makes clear, these integrals represent the marginal utility.
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Once u˜E(t) − u˜I(t) > 0, the user will accept all migration opportunities
(φ∗ = 1). She will start accepting migration opportunities sometime before
u˜E(t) = u˜I(t); if she waited until u˜E(t) − u˜I(t) ≥ 0, then she would find
herself on the incumbent platform with probability 1 at a time where the
incumbent platform has lower value than the entrant platform. She prefers
taking the risk of migrating when the entrant platform still yields slightly
less utility than the incumbent platform.
To prove that φ∗ = 1 once migration has started, one shows that, if this
were not the case, the user would be better off by waiting to start migrating
and then accepting all migration opportunities later. She can do this in a way
which increases the (expected) time she spends on the incumbent platform
while u˜E(t)−u˜I(t) < 0 and at the same time keeping constant the probability
that she is on the incumbent platform when it becomes positive.
One important corollary of Proposition 1 is that, for any h(·), there is
a unique optimal strategy. As a consequence, similar users will all choose
the same strategy and we exploit this fact in the equilibrium analysis that
follows.
3.2 Equilibrium
We now embed the individual optimization problem into an equilibrium
model. There is an incumbent platform I and an entrant platform E. At
time t, a mass h(t) of users are members of the incumbent platform, while
the entrant platform has 1 − h(t) users. At the outset, all users are on the
incumbent platform: h(0) = 1.
Although some of our results are valid more generally, in the remainder
of this paper (except in section 7) we assume that all users have the same
utility function: if there is a mass h of users on the incumbent and therefore a
mass 1−h on the entrant, the utility of the users of platform I is uI(h, t) and
those of platform E is uE(1− h, t). These utility functions are continuously
differentiable and strictly increasing in their first arguments, so there are
positive network externalities. Furthermore, we assume that
uE(h, t)− uI(1− h, t)
is weakly increasing in t for any h.
As in most of the literature on network externalities, we assume that there
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is no switching cost.8 The lifetime discounted utility of a user who migrates
at time t = T is9∫ T
0
uI(h(t), t)e
−rt dt+
∫ +∞
T
uE(1− h(t), t)e−rt dt.
The framework is quite flexible. For instance, the entry of a new platform in
a market where none existed could be represented by assuming uI(h, t) ≡ 0
for all h(t), t.
Let h(t) be the measure of users on the incumbent platform at time t.
As in 3.1, in any interval of time [t, t + dt], each consumer on the incum-
bent platform is given an irreversible opportunity to migrate with probabil-
ity µ(h(t), t) × dt. Therefore, a migration path h(t) is feasible if and only if
h(0) = 1 and
−µ(h(t), t) × h(t) ≤ h′(t) ≤ 0 for all t.
Individual users cannot affect the aggregate migration path and will choose
a strategy φ(·) that maximizes∫ ∞
0
[
uI(h(t), t)pi(t) + uE(h(t), t)(1− pi(t))
]
e−rtdt, (4)
which, by the same reasoning that led to (2), implies
pi(t) = exp
[
−
∫ t
0
µ
(
h(τ), τ
)
φ(τ)dτ
]
. (5)
Since each individual takes h(t) as given, by Proposition 1, all users follow
the same strategy φ.
This enables us to write the following definition.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium Migration Path). An equilibrium migration path
is a path h such that, taking h(·) as given, φ maximizes (4) subject to (5)
and such that
h′(t) = −h(t)× µ(h(t), t)× φ(t).
8See Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for a discussion of switching costs and Crémer and
Biglaiser (2012) for a discussion of the way switching costs interact with network exter-
nalities.
9This essentially assumes that strategies are measurable in the sense that no single user
can influence the migration of others.
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Since consumers are ex-ante identical and follow the same strategy, they
all have the same probability of being on the incumbent at any time t. Be-
cause the total mass of consumers is 1, by (5) we have
h(t) = pi(t) = exp
[
−
∫ t
0
µ
(
h(τ), τ
)
φ(τ)dτ
]
.
We can now define migration equilibria:
Definition 2 (Migration equilibria). A migration equilibrium is an equilib-
rium migration path h(t) where a strictly positive mass of consumers migrate:
limt→+∞ h(t) < 1.
From Proposition 1 and the definition of migration equilibrium, follows
Proposition 2 (whose proof is straightforward and therefore omitted).
Proposition 2. In any migration equilibrium, all consumers use the same
threshold strategy. There exists a t0 such that h(t) = 1 for t ≤ t0 and
h′(t) = −µ(h(t), t)× h(t) for all t > t0.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 2 and plays
an important role in the sequel.
Corollary 1. There exists a migration equilibrium if and only if there exists
a t0 such that
10∫ +∞
t0
h(t)
[
uE
(
1− h(t), t)− uI(h(t), t)]e−r(t−t0) dt ≥ 0 (6)
with
h(t) =
1 if t < t0,1− ∫ t
t0
µ(h(τ), τ)h(τ) dτ if t ≥ t0.
(7)
If t0 > 0, condition (6) must be satisfied as an equality.
If µ, uI and uE are independent of t, there exists a migration equilibrium
if and only if ∫ +∞
0
h(t)
[
uE
(
1− h(t))− uI(h(t))]e−rt dt ≥ 0. (8)
10Notice that (6) corresponds to (3a) and (3b) in Proposition 1 while Condition (8)
below corresponds to (3a).
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with
h(t) = 1−
∫ t
0
µ
(
h(τ)
)× h(τ) dτ. (9)
If inequality (8) holds strictly, there is a unique migration equilibrium which
starts at t = 0: h(t) < 1 for all t > 0.
If there is a migration equilibrium, there must be a date t = t0 after
which users accept their first opportunity to migrate. A user who migrates
at time t = t0 has a discounted utility equal to∫ +∞
t0
uE(h(t), t)e
−r(t−t0) dt (10)
where h(t), defined by (7), is the mass of users on the incumbent platform if
all users choose to migrate. If she chooses to wait for the next opportunity,
given that every customer uses the same strategy, at any time t ≥ t0 she
will be on the incumbent platform with probability h(t) and on the entrant
platform with probability 1− h(t), which yields an expected utility of∫ +∞
t0
[
h(t)× uI(h(t), t) + (1− h(t))× uE(1− h(t), t)
]
e−r(t−t0) dt ≥ 0. (11)
Condition (6) states that (10) is greater than (11), and therefore that at t0
users prefer migrating than waiting for the next opportunity. If (6) is a strict
inequality with t0 > 0, then a user who receives an opportunity to migrate
just before t0 would have strict incentives to accept it.
The proof that (8) is necessary and sufficient when the migration process
and the utilities are independent of time is straightforward. If (8) is a strict
inequality, at date t = 0 users prefer to migrate.11 Then, there is a unique
migration equilibrium where users accept all migration opportunities for t ≥
0. With time dependence, one would have to impose further conditions on µ
and on the utilities to obtain uniqueness of the migration equilibrium.
If
lim
t→+∞
uE(0, t)− uI(1, t) > 0, (12)
there exists some t such that for all t ≥ t users would rather be alone on the
entrant platform than with all the other users on the incumbent platform.
11This occurs when (8) is a strict inequality, not when uE(0) > uI(1).
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Therefore, migration is the unique equilibrium. In all other cases, no migra-
tion (h(t) = 1 for all t) is an equilibrium, although the focus of our inquiry
is on the existence of migration equilibria.
In the case of time independence, (12) becomes uE(0) > uI(1): migration
at time t = 0 is a dominant strategy in the sense that users would choose to
migrate whatever the migration path h(·). Similarly, when uE(1) < uI(0), it
is a dominant strategy not to migrate.12
Assuming that µ, uE, uI are independent of time, migration increases wel-
fare if and only if∫ +∞
0
h(t)uI(h(t))e
−rt dt+ (1−h(t)uE(1−h(t))e−rt dt ≥
∫ +∞
0
uI(1)e
−rt dt
⇐⇒
∫ +∞
0
uE(1− h(t))e−rt dt− uI(1)
1− r
≥
∫ +∞
0
h(t)
[
uE
(
1− h(t))− uI(h(t))]e−rt dt. (13)
In the limit as r → 0, migration increases welfare if uE(1) > uI(1), and
decreases welfare when uE(1) < uI(1).
13 Comparing with the condition for
existence of equilibrium in Corollary 1 one see that, in a migration equilib-
rium, there can be either excessive inertia or excessive migration (we provide
an example in section 5).
It is not surprising that there can be too little migration as we have
focused on the free rider problem faced by users. Perhaps less intuitively,
there can be too much migration as we select the equilibrium most favorable
to migration.
3.3 Linear Utilities
We will sometimes (but not always) consider linear utilities of the form
uI(h) = bI × h,
uE(1− h) = bE × (1− h) + kE.
12We have defined directly migration equilibria in terms of the function h(t) in order
to shortcut the difficulties of defining a game theoretical equilibrium. Our focus on the
existence of migration equilibria is a shortcut for the selection of beliefs favorable to the
entrant.
13Formally, there exists an r such that (13) holds with a strict inequality for all r ≤ r.
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This linear specification allows platforms to differ in the strength of net-
work effects (bE, bI) and/or in their stand-alone quality kE (without loss of
generality, the stand-alone value of the incumbent is normalized to zero). Mi-
gration is a dominant strategy if kE > bI , while not migrating is a dominant
strategy if kE + bE < 0.
With linear utilities, Corollary 1 implies that there exists a migration
equilibrium if and only if
bE + kE
bE + bI
≥
∫ +∞
t0
h2(t)e−rtdt∫ +∞
t0
h(t)e−rtdt
, (14)
with h defined by (7) or (9).
The left-hand-side of (14) depends only on the preferences of the users.
The right-hand-side of (14), which belongs to (0, 1) because h2(t) ≤ h(t),
depends only on the migration process and is therefore a measure of the
incumbency advantage associated with the migration path h.14
A migration equilibrium is more likely to exist the larger the quality ad-
vantage kE of the entrant. An increase in bE also makes migration more
likely.15 A proportional increase in the network effect parameters bE and bI
always decreases the left hand side of (14) and thus makes a migration equi-
librium less likely to exist. Intuitively, an overall increase in the strength
of network effects increases the cost of early migration and therefore makes
users less eager to start the migration process.
Stationarity and zero interest rate
In the sequel, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we assume that the environ-
ment is stationary: the utilities uI and uE and the migration process µ are
independent of t. Moreover, unless explicitly stated otherwise, h(t) refers to
the migration path described by (9) where all users accept the first opportu-
14If the left-hand-side of (14) is greater than 1, then there will be migration for any
migration process h: this occurs when kE > bI and migration is a dominant strategy. If
the left-hand-side is negative, individuals will not migrate for any h: this occurs when
kE + bE < 0 and not migrating is a dominant strategy.
15An increase in bE decreases the left-hand side of (14) if bI < kE but, in this case, the
left-hand side is greater than one so migration is a dominant strategy.
14
nity to migrate (φ(t) = 1 for all t).16 This implies
h′(t) = −h(t)× µ(h(t)) ⇐⇒ h(t) = exp
[
−
∫ t
0
µ
(
h(τ)
)
dτ
]
. (15)
There exists a migration equilibrium, with migration starting at time t = 0
if and only if (8) holds. If it holds strictly, there exists a unique migration
equilibrium.
We will often focus on the case of r = 0. This can be interpreted as either
migration not taking much time or users being very patient. The relevant
integrals need not converge when r = 0.17 Therefore, we will use the following
definition.
Definition 3. A property P(r) holds for r = 0 when there exists a r¯ > 0
such that P(r) holds whenever r < r¯.
4 Analysis
In this section, we use our basic model to explore the determinants of in-
cumbency advantage. We first show that, for low values of r, speeding up
the migration process does not affect the existence of a migration equilib-
rium. We then demonstrate that incumbency advantage is increased by the
availability of more than one migration opportunity. Finally, we explore the
influence of the shape of the migration path h on incumbency advantage.
4.1 Speed of migration
Define an acceleration of the migration path h as a migration path h˜ such
that h˜(t) = h(αt) with α > 1. Equivalently,18 µ˜(h) = α×µ(h). As α becomes
large, migration becomes faster. One might expect that an acceleration of
the migration process reduces incumbency advantage as the first migrants
16We will relax these assumptions in Section 6.1 (where the arrival of migration oppor-
tunities depends explicitly on time) and in Section 7 (where some consumers delay the
acceptance of migration opportunities).
17For instance in (14), the denominator and the numerator could become infinite as r →
0.
18To see this, note that h˜(t) = h(αt) satisfies h˜′(t) = −h˜(t)× µ˜(h(t)) as h˜′(t) = αh(αt)
and h˜(t)× µ˜(h(t)) = h(αt)× αµ(h(αt).
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spend less time with few other users on the entrant platform. However, this
intuition is wrong: for small r, the acceleration of the migration path does
not affect in either way the possibility of migration: acceleration changes the
benefits of migrating and the benefits of waiting in the same proportion.
Proposition 3. When r = 0 an acceleration of the migration process does
not affect the existence of a migration equilibrium: condition (8) holds if and
only if it holds for h˜(t) = h(αt) whatever α ≥ 1.
Proof. Assume that (8) holds for h for all r < r¯. Let α > 1 and h˜(t) = h(αt).
Then, by the change of variable u = t/α, (8) holds with h replaced by h˜ for
all r < αr¯.
An analogous result holds when r is not small. By a similar change of
variables, one can easily show that if condition (8) holds for a migration
process h and discount rate r > 0, it also holds if the process is accelerated
to h˜(t) = h(αt) and the discount rate set to r˜ = αr.
4.2 Multiple migration opportunities
In the introduction and in Section 2, we argued that a crucial difference
between our framework and that of Farrell and Saloner (1986) is the possi-
bility of other migration opportunities in the future after a user refused one.
We also argued this always increases incumbency advantage. Proposition 4
formalises this intuition.
Suppose, as Farrell and Saloner do, that users have a single opportu-
nity to migrate: if they reject it, they remain on the incumbent platform
forever after. The incentives to migrate are lowest at time 0 when a) the
discounted utility after accepting migration is
∫ +∞
0
uE(1 − h(t))e−rtdt and
b) the discounted utility after rejecting it is
∫ +∞
0
uI(h(t))e
−rtdt. Therefore,
a migration equilibrium exists if and only if∫ +∞
0
[uE(1− h(t)− uI(h(t))]e−rt dt ≥ 0. (16)
This implies the following result.
Proposition 4. Whenever there exists a migration equilibrium with multiple
migration opportunities, there exist one with a single migration opportunity:
condition (16) holds whenever (8) does.
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Proof. Assume that (8) holds and uE(1 − h(0)) < uI(h(0)) (otherwise the
result is trivial). There exists t¯ such that uE(1 − h(t¯)) = uI(h(t¯)) with
h(t¯) > 0. Because the function h is decreasing we have∫ +∞
0
h(t)
[
uE(1− h(t))− uI(h(t))
]
e−rt dt
≤ h(t¯)
∫ +∞
0
[uE(1− h(t)− uI(h(t))]e−rt dt,
and therefore (8) implies (16).
When users have multiple opportunities to migrate, they have incentives
to reject early migration opportunities to avoid being on the entrant platform
when it has few adopters. A take it or leave it offer favors migration due
to the fear of being left behind on the incumbent platform.19
4.3 Coordination increases incumbency
To pursue our inquiry further, it is useful to define the following notation.
For any functions g, g1 and g2 from <+ into <+, define expectation, variance
and covariance under the exponential density re−rt, as follows:
E[g] def=
∫ +∞
0
g(t)re−rt dt.
Similarly,
V[g] def=
∫ +∞
0
(
g(t)− E[g]
)2
re−rt dt
= E[g2]− E[g]2
and
Cov[g1, g2]
def
=
∫ +∞
0
(
g1(t)− E[g1]
)(
g2(t)− E[g2]
)
re−rt dt
= E[g1g2]− E[g1]E[g2],
This implies V[g] = Cov[g, g].
19The discussion surrounding equation (17) below provides more intuition on this issue.
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We can rewrite (14) as
bE + kE
bE + bI
≥
∫ +∞
0
h2(t)e−rtdt∫ +∞
0
h(t)e−rtdt
= E[h] +
V[h]
E[h]
which provides a simple interpretation for the effect of coordination on incum-
bency advantage. The term V[h] captures how coordinated is the migration
process h(t). Large values of V[h] means that h(t) tends to take values close
to 1 and 0: large masses of users migrate in a coordinated way. If users fore-
see an opportunity for a large coordinated migration, they will have a greater
incentive to reject early opportunities, as waiting gives them a large proba-
bility to migrate alongside a large number of other users in the future, with
minimal loss of utility. Therefore, migration processes with episodes of large
coordinated migration are associated with higher incumbency advantage.
To make this statement more precise, let h˜(t) = h(t) + γ(t), where the
function γ is not uniformly equal to 0 and satisfies the following two prop-
erties: a) E[γ] = 0 and b) there exists a t¯ such that γ(t) ≥ 0 if t ≤ t¯ and
γ(t) ≤ 0 if t ≥ t¯. Obviously, E[h˜] = E[h] and20 V[h˜] > V[h]: the migration
path h˜ is less favorable to migration than the path h. Figure 1 illustrates
migration processes with similar E[h(t)] ≈ 1/2 but different values of V[h(t)].
Because µ = −h′/h, we see that a large V[h] (cf. the red curve) is associated
with a small µ for small and large values of h and a larger µ for intermediate
values of h.
To obtain further intuition notice that, when the utility functions are not
linear, we can rewrite (8) as
E
[
uE(1− h(t))− uI(h(t))
]
≥ −Cov
[
h(t), uE(1− h(t))− uI(h(t))
]
E[h(t)]
> 0, (17)
20Indeed,
V[h˜] = E[h2] + E[γ2] + 2E[γh]− E[h˜]2
=
(
E[h2]− E[h˜]2
)
+ E[γ2] + 2
[∫ t¯
0
γ(t)h(t)re−rt dt+
∫ +∞
t¯
γ(t)h(t)re−rt dt
]
≥
(
E[h2]− E[h]2
)
+ E[γ2] + 2h(t)
∫ +∞
0
γ(t)re−rt dt > V[h].
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h(t)
tt = 12
t = 1
Figure 1: A function with a large V[h(t)] (in red, dashed) and small V[h(t)]
(in black).
where the second inequality is a consequence of the fact that h is a decreasing
function of t while uE(1− h(t))− uI(h(t)) is increasing.
Equation (17) has the same left hand side as (16). Its middle term there-
fore provides a measure of how strong the incentives to migrate in a model
with single opportunities to migrate have to be for a migration equilibrium
to exist when individuals actually have multiple opportunities. Because of
the presence of the covariance term, improving the utility on the entrant
network early in the process while keeping E[h(t)] constant makes migration
more likely.
5 Autonomous vs. Word of Mouth Migration
We now specialize the model and assume that migration stems from the
mixture of two easily interpretable basic processes. We think of the first as
stemming from something like advertising or, more generally, from one to
many forms of communications: the frequency at which users see advertise-
19
ments or other form of information, and hence are reminded of the presence
of the entrant platform, is constant over time. More formally, during any
small interval of time of length dt every user on the incumbent platform
has a probability s × dt of being given the opportunity to migrate. We call
this the autonomous migration process, since µ = s is independent of both
h(t) and t.21
In the second process, word of mouth, users learn about the new platform
via pairwise meetings with other users who have already migrated. Formally,
in an interval of time of length dt, any user meets another user with proba-
bility a× dt. Assuming pairs of meetings are equally probable, each user on
the incumbent platform has a probability a × (1 − h(t)) × dt of meeting a
user who belongs to the entrant platform.
In the case of programmers potentially affected by a degradation of the
quality of GitHub, users would presumably learn about alternative platforms
from online news sources or bulletin boards. The migration process would
be closer to autonomous than to word of mouth.
We combine these two processes into the overall migration process22
µ(h(t)) = s+ a(1− h(t)) = a(σ − h(t)).
where the parameter σ = (s + a)/a ∈ (1,+∞) captures the relative impor-
tance of s, the autonomous component of the migration process. For σ → 1,
word of mouth is dominant.23 For σ → ∞, the autonomous component
dominates.
21This is the process assumed, for instance, by Farrell and Saloner (1986).
22 This is the same equation used to define the Bass diffusion process (Bass, 1969, first
equation on p. 217). However, our interpretation is different. Bass defines two types of
users: a) innovators who decide to adopt an innovation independently of the decisions of
other agents in a social system and b) adopters who are influenced ... by the pressures
of the social system (Bass, 1969, p. 216). In our model, all the agents are influenced
by the actions of the other agents. Furthermore, all users are identical but each can be
reminded of the entrant platform in two distinct ways. Most importantly, we provide a
more explicit linkage between our `diffusion' equation and the way in which agents learn
about the new opportunities.
23We must have σ > 1 for migration to occur. If σ = 1, the migration process µ =
a(1 − h) is purely "word of mouth." In this case, the initial condition h(0) = 1 implies
h′(t) = 0 for ll t.
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word of mouth & autonomous, s = 3, a = 10
word of mouth & autonomous, s = 0.5, a = 10
Figure 2: Migration paths as a function of the autonomous parameter s and
the word of mouth parameter a.
Then, (15) implies24
h(t) =
σ
1 + (σ − 1)eσat . (18)
Figure 2 illustrates h(t) for different values of s and a.
We show in Appendix B.1 that when r = 0 the right hand side of (14)
becomes ∫ +∞
0
h2(t)dt∫ +∞
0
h(t)dt
= σ − 1
lnσ − ln(σ − 1) , (19)
which is decreasing in σ, as illustrated in Figure 3 and proved in Appen-
dix B.2. Therefore, with linear utilities, the set of parameters (kE, bE, bI)
for which a migration equilibrium exists, expands as σ increases, i.e. as the
autonomous component of migration becomes relatively more prominent.
24(18) implies h(0) = 1 and
h′(t) = −σ × (σ − 1)× σae
σat
(1 + (σ − 1)eσat)2 = −
(σ − 1)× σaeσat
1 + (σ − 1)eσat h(t) = −a(σ − h(t))h(t).
21
As σ → 1, the word of mouth component of the the migration process
dominates and the right hand side of (19) converges to 1. In this case, a mi-
gration equilibrium exists when kE ≥ bI (migration is a dominant strategy).
Since migration is efficient whenever kE + bE > bI , there exists regions of
the parameter space where migration is socially desirable but no migration
equilibrium exists. Intuitively, with σ ≈ 1, migration relies almost entirely
on word of mouth which, given the initial condition of no participation in
the entrant platform, will leave early migrants enjoying very low network
externalities. This suggests that, in this setting, an entrant has incentives to
jump start the market by engaging in activities which increase σ such as
advertising.
At the other extreme, as σ →∞ the word of mouth component vanishes
and the right hand side of (19) converges to 1/2. This is illustrated in
Figure 3. Then, a migration equilibrium exists if and only if kE ≥ (bI−bE)/2.
Migration is socially desirable if kE ≥ bI − bE, so there can be insufficient
or excessive migration. If bI − bE < 0 (the entrant has stronger network
externalities), there is insufficient migration: for kE ∈ [bI − bE, (bI − bE)/2],
migration is socially desirable but not an equilibrium. On the other hand, if
the incumbent has stronger network externalities (bI − bE > 0), there can be
excessive migration: for kE ∈ [(bI − bE)/2, bI − bE], a migration equilibrium
exists even though migration is not socially desirable.
The case of bE = bI = b and σ →∞ constitutes an important benchmark
which we use below, especially in Section 7. In this case, the strength of
network externalities is equal on both platforms, and migration opportuni-
ties arise solely through the autonomous process (effectively, the migration
process is µ = s). A migration equilibrium exists if and only if migration is
socially efficient: consumers, efficiently, migrate to the entrant if and only if
kE > 0, for any value of the autonomous parameter s.
6 Other determinants of incumbency advantage
Our basic model can be extended in a number of ways to explore how the en-
vironment influences incumbency advantages. First, it is natural to assume
that, once users have been made aware of the entrant platform, they consider
migration more frequently. We show that this increases incumbency advan-
tage. Second, we demonstrate that incumbency advantage decreases when
possibly for strategic reasons, the entrant has limited capacity and cannot ac-
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bE+kE
bE+bI
1
1
1/2
σ
Figure 3: The cutoff (bE + kE)/(bE + bI) as a function of σ, as described
in (19). Notice that the function converges to 1 as σ → 1.
commodate all possible users. Finally, we show that multi-homing decreases,
but does not eliminate, incumbency advantage.25
6.1 Two speeds
It seems plausible that a user of the incumbent platform who has refused to
migrate will think more often of the possibility of migrating than a user who
has not yet been made aware of the existence of the entrant platform. This
increases incumbency advantage, modulo the added assumption described in
footnote 27.
We begin by making the extreme assumption that users who have refused
their first migration opportunity continuously keep in mind the possibility
of moving, and therefore can decide to migrate instantly at any subsequent
time.26 In this setting, a user who is offered the opportunity to move at
time 0 would be better off waiting until enough other users have migrated
that the (instantaneous) utilities on both platforms are equal. Therefore,
25As the environments which we consider in this section and in the next differ from
the environment in which we define equilibrium, to be totally rigorous we would have to
update the theory of sections 3.1 and 3.2. In the interest of brevity, we will not do so and
simply study the circumstances under which migration can start at time 0.
26Equivalently, these individual compute the best time to migrate and set an alarm to
remind themselves to do so.
23
there exists a migration equilibrium if and only if migrating is a dominant
strategy. We formalize this in the following Proposition.27
Proposition 5. If consumers can migrate at any time after their first migra-
tion opportunity, a migration equilibrium where migration begins at time 0
exists if and only if migration is a dominant strategy, i.e., if uE(0) > uI(1).
We continue our analysis by assuming that subsequent opportunities ar-
rive faster than the first, but not infinitely fast. For simplicity, the basic
migration process is autonomous: µ(h) = s. After refusing a first oppor-
tunity users of the incumbent platform receive additional opportunities to
migrate according to an accelerated autonomous process µ(h) = αs. We
are mostly interested in the case of α > 1, but the derivations are valid for
any α. With linear utilities, a user who migrates at t = 0 and expects others
to follow obtains a benefit equal to∫ ∞
0
[bE(1− h(t)) + kE]e−rtdt.
The density function of the time of the next opportunity is e−ast/as.
Therefore, a user who waits for her next opportunity28 to migrate will at
time t be on the incumbent platform with probability e−αst and on the entrant
platform with probability 1− e−αst. Her discounted utility is∫ +∞
0
[
e−αst(bIh(t)) + (1− e−αst)(bE(1− h(t)) + kE)
]
e−rt dt
=
∫ ∞
0
[
bE(1− h(t)) + kE
]
e−rtdt
+
∫ +∞
0
e−αst
[
−(bE + kE) + (bI + bE)h(t)
]
e−rtdt.
27We assume away delayed migration equilibria where the users who receive early
migration opportunities coordinate on all moving at some date t∗ > 0. If uE(1) > uI(1)
and if all users eventually learn about the existence of the entrant, the users who have
learned about the existence of the entrant by some large enough t∗ would be better off,
collectively and individually, if they migrated simultaneously. We eliminate these types of
equilibria by assuming that the entrant platform cannot survive if it has no clients for any
interval of time, so that migration must begin at t = 0 or not at all.
28It is straightforward to prove that it is not optimal to wait for a later opportunity.
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As, by (15), h(t) = e−st, there exists a migration equilibrium if this last term
is positive, i.e., if
0 ≤ −bE + kE
αs+ r
+
bI + bE
αs+ s+ r
.
Proposition 6. With linear utilities and first opportunities arising according
to the autonomous migration process of parameter s and future opportunities
according to the autonomous process of parameter α × s with α > 1, a mi-
gration equilibrium exists if and only if
bI − kE
bE + kE
≤ s
αs+ r
. (20)
Since the right-hand side of (20) is decreasing with α, the incumbent
is more likely to keep its market position if the users can migrate more
frequently once they become aware of the existence of the entrant.
6.2 Capacity constraints
So far we have assumed that the entrant has the capacity to service all users.
We now assume that the entrant has maximum capacity of 1 − κ < 1. We
show that the fear of being left behind on the incumbent platform increases
incentives to migrate. Thus, it could be in an entrant's best interest to reduce
its capacity in order to kick start migration.
The capacity constraint stops migration at t = T such that 1 − h(T ) =
1−κ (we are assuming that limt→+∞ h(t) = 0).29 Then, by the same reasoning
that leads to (4), the utility of a user who does not migrate at time 0 is∫ T
0
[
h(t)uI(h(t)) + (1− h(t))uE(1− h(t))
]
e−rt dt
+
∫ ∞
T
[κuI(κ) + (1− κ)uE(1− κ)]e−rtdt.
Comparing this to her utility if she migrated,∫ T
0
uE(1− h(t))e−rt dt+
∫ ∞
T
uE(1− κ)e−rtdt,
29Formally, this implies that the capacity-constrained model is a special case of the
model of Section 3, with µ(h) = 0 for h small enough.
25
the test for the existence of a migration equilibrium is changed from (8) to∫ T
0
h(t)(uE(1−h(t))−uI(h(t))e−rt dt+
∫ ∞
T
κ(uE(1−κ)−uI(κ))e−rtdt ≥ 0.
(21)
We assume that uE(1)−uI(0) > 0, and that the derivative of h× [uE(1−
h) − uI(h)] for h = 0 is strictly positive. Hence for κ small enough and
therefore T large enough
κ(uE(1− κ)− uI(κ)) > h(t)[uE(1− h(t))− uI(h(t))]
for all t ≥ T and (21) is easier to satisfy than (8). This yields the following
proposition.
Proposition 7. A small reduction in capacity by the entrant makes more
likely the existence of a migration equilibrium: the set of utility functions
(uI , uE) such that a migration equilibrium exists with a capacity constraint
(strictly) contains the set of utility functions such that a migration equilibrium
exists without one.
Therefore, an entrant might be able to initiate the migration process by
committing, if it can, to accept a limited number of users.
6.3 Multi-homing
It is common for users to participate simultaneously in multiple platforms
(multi-homing). We show that this decreases, but does not eliminate, incum-
bency advantage.
Suppose that once a user receives a migration opportunity, she has three
options: a) continue single-homing on the incumbent; b) multi-home on both
platforms; or c) single-home on the entrant. A multi-homing user can choose
at any time to abandon the incumbent platform and switch to single-homing
on the entrant platform.30
Let the utility of a consumer single-homing on the incumbency and en-
trant platforms be, respectively, uI(h(t)) = u(h(t)) and uE(1 − h(t)) =
u(1− h(t)) + kE. A multi-homing user is connected to all other consumers,
so her net benefits are
uM = u(1) + kE − c. (22)
30Consistent with our assumption that migration is irreversible, we assume that a user
cannot return to single-homing on the incumbent after multi-homing.
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A multi-homing user is connected to a mass 1 of consumers and therefore
obtains utility u(1), in addition to the entrant platform's utility advantage
kE. On the other hand, multi-homing also imposes a cost c > 0, which can
reflect either the fact that the consumer must divide her limited time between
the two platforms, or that there is some loss of enjoyment by multitasking
on both platforms.31 We assume that c is small enough that it is worthwhile
paying it when h = 1: u(1)− c ≥ u(0).
Consumers prefer multi-homing to single-homing when
u(1) + kE − c ≥ u(1− h(t)) + kE
⇐⇒ u(1)− u(1− h(t))− c ≥ 0. (23)
The left-hand-side of (23) is monotonically decreasing in t and, by assump-
tion, positive for t = 0. Therefore, there exists a t¯ such that the inequality
holds for t ∈ [0, t¯], and it is reversed for t > t¯. Multi-homing is preferred
early on, while there is still a significant mass of users only reachable through
the incumbent platform (t ∈ [0, t¯]). Once a sufficient mass of users is multi-
homing, the advantage of being connected to the incumbent platform be-
comes lower than the cost of multi-homing. At that point (t = t¯), users
choose to single-home on the entrant.
Multi-homing increases the utility of a user who migrates at time 0 by∫ t¯
0
(u(1)− u(1− h(t))− c)e−rtdt. (24)
The additional benefit of delaying migration at date t = 0 with the possibility
of migrating at a future date and multi-homing if the date is less than t¯ is∫ t¯
0
(1− h(t))[u(1)− u(1− h(t))− c]e−rtdt. (25)
Since for t ∈ [0, t¯], we have u(1) − u(1 − h(t)) − c ≥ 0 and 1 − h(t) < 1, at
time 0, a user gains more from migration when she can multi-home.
Proposition 8. If multi-homing is possible, a migration equilibrium is more
likely (i.e., exists for lower values of kE) than if multi-homing is impossible.
31An alternative assumption would be that multi-homing brings only part of the stand
alone benefits of belonging to the entrant platform, so that (22) would become uM =
b+αkE− c, with α ∈ (0, 1). This would lead to similar results as having the multi-homing
cost be cˆ = c+ (1− α)kE .)
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In a report written for the European Commission, Crémer, de Montjoye
and Schweitzer (2019) argue that dominant firms should be asked to justify
the use of policies that deter multi-homing. This proposal was made on the
basis of an intuition similar to that of this section: multi-homing decreases
incumbency advantage, and a dominant firm should be allowed to discourage
it only when this has clear pro-competitive consequences (as it sometimes
does, for reasons not analyzed in this paper).
7 Heterogeneous users
Up to this point, all users share the same preferences. We now allow for
user heterogeneity and study its effect on incumbency advantage. Our main
takeaways are: 1) equilibria can have delayed or no migration by a sub-set
of users and 2) users can inefficiently segregate themselves across different
platforms.
We assume that the utility of all the users is bh on the incumbent platform.
Utility on the entrant platform is{
b(1− h) + kE for a mass pH of eager users,
b(1− h) + kL for a mass pL = 1− pH of reluctant users.
We call k = pHkH+pLkL the average value of the quality difference of the en-
trant platform. Migration opportunities arise solely based on the autonomous
process, so µ(h) = s > 0 for all h. There is no discounting: r = 0.
7.1 Migration equilibria with heterogeneous users
We focus on the maximal-migration equilibria, that is, those equilibria in
which the greatest number of users migrate and do so as early as possible. In
these equilibria, eager users (if they migrate) accept migration opportunities
for all t ≥ 0, and reluctant users (if they migrate) accept all migration
opportunities for all t ≥ TL for some some TL ≥ 0. The equilibrium migration
path is
h(t) =
{
pHe
−st + (1− pH) t ∈ [0, TL],
pHe
−st + (1− pH)e−s(t−TL) t ≥ TL.
(26)
We obtain the following proposition, which is illustrated by Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Types of equilibria with heterogeneous users.
Proposition 9. The maximal-migration equilibria satisfy:
• If and only if k > 0 and bpH > −kL, the maximal migration equilib-
rium is a staggered equilibrium where eager users accept all migration
opportunities and reluctant users accept all migration opportunities for
t ≥ TL, where TL is defined by
pH(1− e−sTL) = −kL/b. (27)
• If and only if kH > (1− pH)b and bpH ≤ −kL, the maximal migration
equilibrium is a segregated equilibrium where eager users accept all
migration opportunities and reluctant users never migrate.
• In all other cases, there exists no migration in any equilibrium.
For reasons similar to those discussed after Corollary 2, in any maximal-
migration equilibrium, eager types accept all migration opportunities. In a
staggered migration equilibrium, reluctant types will start accepting migra-
tion opportunities at t = TL, which is the instant at which they derive the
same utility by migrating immediately or by waiting for the next opportunity.
Proof of Proposition 9. As kH > 0, if it is expected that all users will migrate,
by the same reasoning as in the case of homogeneous users in the autonomous
29
kL
kH-bpH−2pH
b(1− pH)
2b(1− pH)
E & W: both types migrate
E & W: neither type migrate
E & W: H migrate; L doesn't
E: H migrate; W: both migrate
E: H migrate; W: no migration
k
=
0
Figure 5: Equilibria and welfare with 2 types of users. The legend
should be read as follows. E and W indicate respectively the Equilibrium and
Social welfare maximising configurations. For instance, the first line shows
that, for the relevant configuration of parameters, only the eager consumers
migrate whereas it would be socially optimal not to have any migration at
all. The bottom line indicates that, in equilibrium, eager consumers migrate
while reluctant consumers do not, and this is socially optimal.
case, eager users find it optimal to migrate starting at time 0. The value of
TL is computed in the Appendix's Lemma C.1, while the identification of the
staggered and segregated equilibria are conducted in Lemma C.2. As one
would expect from the analysis of the autonomous migration process with
homogeneous users, in a segregated equilibrium, eager users migrate if and
only if it is efficient for them to do so knowing that reluctant users will not
migrate, i.e., if the quality benefit of the entrant platform is greater than the
loss of the externality benefits stemming from the absence of the reluctant
users.
7.2 Welfare with Heterogenous Users
We now discuss the relationship between equilibrium and efficiency in the
model with preference heterogeneity. Since r = 0, the welfare lost during
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the migration process itself is ignored. Instead, we focus on long run welfare
once almost all individuals have made their migration decisions, that is
b without migration,
b+ pHkH + (1− pH) kL if all users migrate,
b (1− pH)2 + pH (bpH + kH) if only eager users migrate.
The social desirability of migration can therefore be described as follows.
Proposition 10. No migration is optimal if k < 0 and kH < 2b(1− pH).
• All users migrating is optimal if k > 0 and kL > −2bpH .
• Only eager users migrating is optimal if kH > 2b(1 − pH) and kL <
−2bpH .
Figure 5 illustrates Proposition 10 and contrasts socially optimal behav-
iour with the equilibrium behaviour described in Proposition 9. The three
green shaded areas in the figure illustrate regions of the parameter space when
a migration equilibrium exists and it is the welfare maximising outcome.
First, if kH/|kL| is large, there exists a migration equilibrium where both
types migrate. This is socially desirable since the mild aversion of reluctant
users is not enough to justify the loss in network externalities that would
result from segregation.32 Second, if kL is very negative and kH not too
large, so that k < 0, a migration equilibrium does not exist. In this case,
migration is also socially undesirable because preferences are, overall, in favor
of the incumbent and the mild preferences of eager types for the entrant
are not enough to justify segregation. Third, if preferences are sufficiently
polarised (both |kL| and kH large), there exists a migration equilibrium where
only eager users migrate. This is socially optimal because each type has an
extreme preference for a different platform.
In the red regions of Figure 5, the equilibrium outcome is not socially
desirable. The inefficiency is always due to excessive segregation: types kH
migrate and types kL do not, but it would be optimal for all users to be in
the same platform since this maximises network externalities. If |kL| is much
greater than kH , the socially optimal outcome is for all types to remain on
the incumbent platform. If kH is much larger than |kL|, it is optimal for all
users to migrate. The excessive migration of the eager users arises because
they do not take into account the negative externalities they impose on the
reluctant users.
32Migration is staggered, but since we are considering the limit as r → 0, this delay does
not affect long run welfare.
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8 Conclusions and paths for future research
There are many extensions of our model which could be worth exploring,
for instance imperfect information about the quality of the entrant platform.
Also, we have used a simplified description of the timing of the migration
decisions. If the agents belonged to a more structured network, the deci-
sions of their neighbors would prompt each user to decide whether or not
to migrate. Kempe, Kleinberg and Tardos (2015) have studied the diffusion
of an innovation in a network, where the agents are represented as nodes in
a graph. However, they assume exogenous rules for adoption. For instance,
in their linear threshold model, an agent adopts the innovation if a suffi-
cient number of his neighbors do.33 It would be interesting to study such
a model in the context of migration between platforms, with a more solid
game theoretical basis. However, Kempe et al. show that the problem is
computationally difficult even without this complication. Thinking of the
proper representation of the bounded rationality of agents for such decisions
would be of great interest.
We have assumed that consumers act strategically, but that platforms do
not. This was done to focus on how the consequences of the migration process
on migration incentives. There are many ways to model competition among
platforms, and we believe that our framework can be used as a building block
for this analysis. For instance, in reality entrants choose the quality of their
platform. This would be natural in many settings with network externalities
for firms to compete in quality and not prices, such as social media platforms
where platform revenues are generated through advertising. If this does not
affect a consumers' migration opportunities, then clearly the entrant would
choose the minimum quality level that induces early consumers to migrate.
Platforms can also affect the migration opportunities of consumers. For ex-
ample, they can choose the rate at which consumers see ads and hence affect
the migration process  there could be interesting links to the marketing
literature.
Another direction is to allow platforms to choose prices. This brings up
various interesting economic issues. Whether platforms can use history de-
pendent prices  in the sense of charging different prices for new and old
33This is a very simplified description of that model. Actually each agent exerts a (exog-
enous) weight on the decision by his neighbors to imitate this adoption of the innovation.
An agent adopts the innovation if the sum of these weights for his neighbors who have
accepted the innovation is large enough.
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consumers  has been discussed in the literature (see, for instance, Cabral,
2019). The amount of information available to online platforms raises other
possibilities. For instance, platforms have information about the social graph
of users and prices could be made dependent on the number of their contacts
who have migrated. Closer in spirit to our model, platforms often know
the information available to users, and in particular they can know whether
users have seen ads for the new platform or have read reviews of its features.
Charging higher prices to consumers who have turned down previous oppor-
tunities to migrate might help mitigate the free riding phenomena which we
have discussed in this paper (although we suspect that the same data would
also provide information about the willingness to pay of the consumer, which
would also be relevant for pricing).
Finally, in reality platforms are not as perfectly substitutable as they are
in our model, and multi-homing is often used to take advantage of different
functionalities. For instance, the same people might communicate through
e-mail or through WhatsApp depending on the nature of the communication.
To study this issue, one would need to think, instead of migration of users,
about migration of communications.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove Proposition 1 we show the following, more general, result.
Let v : <+ → < be a continuous differentiable decreasing function with
v(0) > 0 and limt→+∞ v(t) finite. Let g : <+ → (0, 1] be continuous and
strictly decreasing with g(0) = 1. Let µ : <+ → <++ be a function from into
<++ with µ(t) > 0 for all t.
(Note, the fact that g is always strictly positive ensures that migration
will last forever  the same results would hold with migration ending in
finite time.)
Let φ∗ be a solution of the problem
max
φ:<+→[0,1]
∫ +∞
0
v(t)pi(t;φ)e−rt dt,
subject to pi(t;φ) = g
(∫ t
0
µ(τ)φ(τ) dτ
)
.
We show the following two Propositions.
Proposition A.1. There exists T ∈ [0,+∞)⋃{+∞}, with T ≤ inf{t :
v(t) ≤ 0} such that φ∗(t) is equal to 0 on [0, T ) and to 1 on (T ,+∞).
Proposition A.2. If the function g is twice differentiable and concave, then
a necessary and sufficient condition for T to be optimal is
T ×
∫ +∞
T
v(t)g′
(∫ t
0
µ(τ)φ(τ) dτ
)
e−rt dt = 0. (A.1)
Proposition A.1 is a direct consequence of Lemmas A.1 to A.4. The proof
of Proposition A.2 is presented after these lemmas.
Lemma A.1. If v(t) > 0 for all t, then φ∗(t) = 0 for nearly all t.
Proof. For all φ strictly greater than 0 on a measurable interval, pi(t;φ) < 1
for all t greater than some t′ and therefore
∫ +∞
0
v(t)pi(t;φ)e−rt dt <
∫ +∞
0
v(t)e−rt dt,
which is attainable with φ(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
From now on, we assume limt→+∞ v(t) < 0.
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Lemma A.2. If v(T ) < 0, then φ∗(t) = 1 for nearly all t ≥ T .
Proof. Because v is decreasing, v(t) < 0 for all t ≥ T .
Assume that we did not have φ∗(t) = 1 for nearly all t ≥ T . For any t
in some interval [t1, t2] with T ≤ t1 < t2 we would have φ∗(t) < 1. Let
φ˜(t) = φ∗(t) for t ≤ T and equal to 1 for t > T . Then, pi(t; φ˜) = pi(t;φ∗) for
t ≤ T , pi(t; φ˜) ≤ pi(t;φ∗) for t ≥ T and pi(t; φ˜) < pi(t;φ∗) for t > t1. This
would imply∫ +∞
0
v(t)pi(t; φ˜)e−rt dt =
∫ t1
0
v(t)pi(t; φ˜)e−rt dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∫ t1
0 v(t)pi(t;φ
∗)e−rt dt
+
∫ +∞
t1
v(t)pi(t; φ˜)e−rt dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
>
∫+∞
t1
v(t)pi(t;φ∗)e−rt dt
>
∫ +∞
0
v(t)pi(t;φ∗)e−rt dt,
which establishes the contradiction.
Because v is decreasing and continuous, it is equal to zero on an interval
[T 0, T
0
], with, of course, maybe, T 0 = T
0
.
Lemma A.3. For nearly all t > T 0, φ∗(t) = 1.
Proof. If T 0 = T
0
, the lemma is a direct consequence of lemma A.2. Assume
therefore that we have T 0 < T
0
.
Let φ˜(t) = φ∗(t) for t ≤ T 0 and to 1 for t > T 0. Clearly, pi(t; pi) = pi(t; pi∗)
for t ≤ T 0. For t > T 0, we have∫ t
0
µ(τ)φ˜(τ) dτ =
∫ T 0
0
µ(τ)φ˜(τ) dτ +
∫ t
T 0
µ(τ)φ˜(τ) dτ
=
∫ T 0
0
µ(τ)φ∗(τ) dτ +
∫ t
T 0
µ(τ)φ˜(τ) dτ
≥
∫ T 0
0
µ(τ)φ∗(τ) dτ +
∫ t
T 0
µ(τ)φ∗(τ) dτ,
which implies, because g is decreasing, pi(t; φ˜) ≤ pi(t; pi∗) with a strict in-
equality if φ∗(t) is not nearly always equal to 1 for τ ∈ (T 0, t).
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Therefore∫ +∞
0
v(t)pi(t; φ˜)e−rt dt =
∫ T 0
0
v(t)pi(t; φ˜)e−rt dt+
∫ +∞
T 0
v(t)pi(t; φ˜)e−rt dt
≥
∫ T 0
0
v(t)pi(t; pi∗)e−rt dt+
∫ +∞
T 0
v(t)pi(t; pi∗)e−rt dt
=
∫ +∞
0
v(t)pi(t; pi∗)e−rt dt
with a strict inequality if φ∗(t) is not nearly always equal to 1, which proves
the result.
Lemma A.4. There exist a T ∈ [0, T 0] such that φ∗(t) is equal to 0 for
nearly all t ∈ [0, T ] and to 1 for nearly all t ∈ [T , T 0].
Proof. For T ≤ T 0 let h(T ) def= ∫ T 0
T
µ(τ)dτ . The function h is continuous and
decreasing on [0, T 0] and satisfies
h(0) =
∫ T 0
0
µ(τ)dτ ≥
∫ T 0
0
µ(τ) pi(τ ;φ∗)dτ ≥ 0 = h(T 0).
Therefore there exists T such that h(T ) =
∫ T 0
0
µ(τ)pi(τ ;φ∗)dτ .
Let φ˜ be defined by
φ˜(t) =

0 for t ≤ T ,
1 for t ∈ (T , T 0],
φ∗(t) for t ≥ T 0.
This implies∫ t
0
µ(τ)φ˜(τ) dτ ≤
∫ t
0
µ(τ)φ∗(τ) dτ for t ∈ [0, T ],∫ t
0
µ(τ)φ˜(τ) dτ =
∫ T 0
0
µ(τ)φ˜(τ) dτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∫ T0
0 µ(τ)φ
∗(τ) dτ
−
∫ T 0
t
µ(τ)φ˜(τ) dτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥∫ T0t µ(τ)φ∗(τ) dτ
≤
∫ t
0
µ(τ)φ∗(τ) dτ
for t ∈ [T , T 0],∫ t
0
µ(τ)φ˜(τ) dτ =
∫ T 0
0
µ(τ)φ˜(τ) dτ +
∫ t
T 0
µ(τ)φ˜(τ) dτ =
∫ t
0
µ(τ)φ∗(τ) dτ
for t ≥ T 0.
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Because g is decreasing, this implies
pi(t) = pi∗(t) for t ≥ T 0
when v(t) is negative, and
pi(t) ≥ pi∗(t) for t ≤ T 0
when v(t) is positive, with a strict inequality if φ∗(t) 6= φ˜(t) on a subset of
[0, T 0] of measure greater than 0 and proves the lemma and therefore the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition A.2. By Proposition A.1 the optimal T is solution of
max
T≥0
∫ T
0
v(t)e−rt dt+
∫ +∞
T
v(t)g
(∫ t
T
µ(τ) dτ
)
e−rtdt.
After elimination of two terms which cancel out, the derivative of the maxi-
mand of this expression is equal to∫ +∞
T
[
v(t)g′
(∫ t
T
µ(τ) dτ
)
×
(
−µ˜(T )
)]
e−rt dt
= −µ˜(T )
∫ +∞
T
[
v(t)g′
(∫ t
T
µ(τ)
]
dτ
)
e−rt dt. (A.2)
By assumption µ˜ is strictly positive, we have therefore proved that condi-
tion (A.1) is a necessary condition. To see that it is a sufficient condition,
note that
d
dT
[∫ +∞
T
v(t) g′
(∫ t
T
µ(τ) dτ
)
e−rt dt
]
= −v(T )g′(0)e−rT − µ˜(T )
∫ +∞
T
g′′
(∫ t
T
µ(τ) dτ
)
e−rt dt.
The first term is positive because v(T ) > 0 on the relevant range and g is
decreasing. So is the second term when g is concave. Hence, the derivative
of the second term of the right hand side of (A.2) is negative, which implies
that the derivative is negative everywhere if it is for T = 0 and cannot be
equal to 0 more than once.
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B Proofs for Section 5
B.1 Proof of (19)
We first derive an expression for
∫ +∞
0
h(t) dt. Because
d
dt
[
σt− ln[1 + (σ − 1)e
σat]
a
]
= σ − (σ − 1)σae
σat
a(1 + (σ − 1)eσat) = h(t),
we have ∫ +∞
0
h(t) dt =
[
σt− ln[1 + (σ − 1)e
σat]
a
]+∞
0
. (B.3)
Also
lim
t→+∞
[
σt− ln(1 + (σ − 1)e
σat)
a
]
= lim
t→+∞
[
σt− ln[(σ − 1)e
σat]
a
− ln
(
1 +
1
(σ − 1)eσat
)]
= lim
t→+∞
[
σt− ln(σ − 1)
a
− σt− 1
(σ − 1)eσat
]
= − ln(σ − 1)
a
and
σt− ln[1 + (σ − 1)e
σat]
a
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= − lnσ
a
.
Therefore, from (B.3) ∫ +∞
0
h(t) dt =
lnσ − ln(σ − 1)
a
.
We now compute
∫ +∞
0
h2(t) dt. Note that h′(t) = −µ(h(t))×h(t) implies
h2(t) = h′(t)/a+ σh(t) and therefore∫ +∞
0
h2(t) dt =
[h(t)]+∞0
a
+ σ
∫ +∞
0
h(t) dt
=
−1
a
+ σ
lnσ − ln(σ − 1)
a
=
σ(lnσ − ln(σ − 1))− 1
a
.
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B.2 The right hand side of (19) is decreasing in σ
The derivative of the right hand side of (19) with respect to σ is
1 +
1
σ
− 1
σ − 1
(lnσ − ln(σ − 1))2 = 1−
1
σ(σ − 1)(lnσ − ln(σ − 1))2 > 0,
where the inequality is a consequence of the fact that, by strict concavity of
the function ln, we have
lnσ − ln(σ − 1) < ∂ ln
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
σ=σ−1
× (σ − (σ − 1)) = 1
σ − 1 .
C Proofs for Section 7
The two lemmas in this appendix assume the hypotheses of Section 7.
Lemma C.1. If eager users begin migrating at time 0 and reluctant users
begin migrating at time t ≥ TL > 0, TL satisfies (27).
Proof. Under the hypotheses of the lemma, for t ≥ TL, a reluctant user is
on the incumbent platform with probability e−s(t−TL). Migrating at time TL
yields the same utility than waiting for the next opportunity; therefore∫ +∞
TL
[b(1− h(t)) + kL]e−rt dt
=
∫ +∞
TL
[
e−s(t−T )bh(t) + (1− e−s(t−T ))[b(1− h(t)) + kL]
]
e−rt dt
=
∫ +∞
TL
[b(1− h(t)) + kL]e−rt dt
+
∫ +∞
TL
e−s(t−T )[2bh(t)− b− kL]e−rt dt.
This implies
∫∞
TL
e−s(t−T )[2bh(t) − b − kL]e−rt dt = 0 and therefore, by (26)
and taking the limit as r → 0,
kL + b
s
=
b
s
[
(1− pH) + e−sTpH
]
,
which implies (27).
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Lemma C.2. Eager users migrate at time t = 0 if{
kH ≥ −(1− pH)kL/pH when reluctant users begin migrating at TL < +∞,
kH ≥ b (1− pH) otherwise.
Proof. An eager user migrates at time 0 rather than wait for the next oppor-
tunity if∫ +∞
0
[b(1− h(t)) + kH ]e−rt dt ≥∫ +∞
0
[
e−stbh(t) + (1− e−st)[b(1− h(t)) + kH ]
]
e−rt dt
⇐⇒
∫ +∞
0
[b+ kH ]e
−(r+s)t dt ≥
∫ +∞
0
2be−(r+s)th(t) dt
Using (26), this is equivalent to
kH + b
2b(s+ r)
≥
∫ TL
0
[
e−(r+2s)tpH + e−(r+s)t(1− pH)
]
dt
+
∫ +∞
TL
[
e−(r+2s)tpH + e−(r+s)(t−TL)(1− pH)
]
dt.
As r → 0 and using (27), this condition is equivalent to kH/b ≥ (1 −
pH)(1− e−sTL) = −(1− pH)kL/(bpH). This completes the proof for the case
TL < +∞.
The result for TL = +∞ follows trivially. It is equivalent to the fact that
for purely autonomous migration process and r → 0, migration takes place
if and only if it is efficient.
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